One Share - One Vote: the Theory

Mike Burkart and Samuel Lee

Review of Finance, 2008, vol. 12, issue 1, 1-49

Abstract: The theoretical literature on security-voting structure can be organized around three questions: What impact do nonvoting shares have on takeover outcomes? How does disproportional voting power affect the incentives of blockholders? What are the repercussions of mandating one share - one vote for firms' financing and ownership choices? Overall, the costs and benefits of separating cash flow and votes reflect the fundamental governance trade off between disempowering blockholders and empowering managers. It is therefore an open question whether mandating one share - one vote would improve the quality of corporate governance, notably in systems that so far relied on active owners. Copyright 2008, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: One Share - One Vote: The Theory (2007)
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