Firm Concentration & Job Design: The Case of Schedule Flexible Work Arrangements

Abi Adams-Prassl, Maria Balgova, Matthias Qian and Tom Waters

No 1002, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: We build a model of job design under monopsony that yields predictions over the relationship between: (i) the amenity value of non-wage job features; (ii) whether they are costly or profitable to firms; (iii) monopsony power. We analyse the amenity value of schedule flexibility offered in the labour market by combining our model’s predictions with a new measure of schedule flexibility, which we construct from job vacancy text using a supervised machine learning approach. We show that the amenity value of schedule flexibility depends crucially on whether it is offered alongside a salaried contract that insures workers from earnings variation.

Date: 2023-02-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-com and nep-hrm
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