Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions

Alan Beggs

No 232, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper considers a simple adaptive learning rule in Bayesian games where players employ threshold strategies. Global convergence results are given for supermodular games and potentital games.

Keywords: Bayesian Games; Learning; Binary Actions; Passive Stochastic Approximation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions (2009)
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