Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting

Kevin Roberts

No 236, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: An intertemporal voting model is examined where, at each date, there is a pairwise majority vote between the existing chosen state and some other state, chosen randomly. Intertemporal voting simplifies the strategic issues and the agenda setting is as unrestricted as possible. The possibility of cycles is examined, both in the intertemporal extension to the Condorcet paradox and in more general examples. The set of possibilities is rich, as is demonstrated by an exhaustive study of a three person, three state world. Equilibrium in pure strategies may fail to exist but a weakening of the equilibrium concept to admit probabilistic voting allows a general existence result to be proved. The analysis leads to the development of a dominant state which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner.

Keywords: Condorcet Paradox; Condorcet Winner; Majority Voting; Intertemporal Voting; Strategic Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting (2007)
Working Paper: Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting (2005)
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