Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces

Thomas Norman

No 251, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze (Monatshefte fur Mathematik 110, 1990, 189-206) and Oechssler and Riedel (Economic Theory 17, 2001, 141-162) provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets of strategies under this process.

Keywords: Replicator dynamics; Evolutionary stability; Continouus strategy spaces; Stable sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces (2008)
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