The Possible and the Impossible in Multi-Agent Learning

H. Young

No 304, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper surveys recent work on learning in games and delineates the boundary between forms of learning that lead to Nash equilibrium and forms that lead to weaker notions of equilibrium (or none at all).

Keywords: Equilibrium; Learning; Dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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