Social Norms

H. Young

No 307, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: The function of a social norm is to coordinate people`s expectations in interactions that possess multiple equilibria. Norms govern a wide range of phenomena, including property rights, contracts, bargains, forms of communication, and concepts of justice. Norms impose uniformity of behavior within a given social group, but often vary substantially among groups. Over time norm shifts may occur, prompted either by changes in objective circumstances or by subjective changes in perceptions and expectations. The dynamics of this process can be modeled using evolutionary game theory, which predict that some norms are more stable than others in the long run.

Keywords: Norms; Institutions; Equilibrium Selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-hpe, nep-law and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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