What should fiscal councils do?

Simon Wren-Lewis and Lars Calmfors

No 537, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Fiscal councils now exist in a number of countries. This paper first considers the extent of deficit bias, potential explanations for it, and how independent institutions could help reduce it. Are fiscal councils complements to or substitutes for fiscal rules, and why do none at present have any formal control over fiscal decisions? The paper then outlines the specific tasks that a fiscal council might undertake, and examines how these are combined in eleven fiscal councils. A more detailed examination is undertaken of the fiscal councils in Sweden and the UK. The paper draws some conclusions on the role of fiscal forecasting, ensuring independence, and the provision of policy advice.

Keywords: Fiscal policy; Debt; Deficit bias; Fiscal council (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E02 E62 E65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-eec and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (103)

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Related works:
Journal Article: What should fiscal councils do? (2011)
Working Paper: What Should Fiscal Councils Do? (2011)
Working Paper: What Should Fiscal Councils Do? (2010)
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