Desert and Inequity Aversion in Teams

David Gill and Rebecca Stone

No 563, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Teams are becoming increasingly important in work settings. We develop a framework to study the strategic implications of a meritocratic notion of desert under which team members care about receiving what they feel they deserve. Team members find it painful to receive less than their perceived entitlement, while receiving more may induce pleasure or pain depending on whether preferences exhibit desert elation or desert guilt. Our notion of desert generalizes distributional concern models to situations in which effort choices affect the distribution perceived to be fair; in particular, desert nests inequity aversion over money net of effort costs as a special case. When identical teammates share output equally, desert guilt generates a continuum of symmetric equilibria. Equilibrium effort can lie above or below the level in the absence of desert, so desert guilt generates behavior consistent with both positive and negative reciprocity and may underpin social norms of cooperation.

Keywords: Desert; deservingness; equity; inequity aversion; loss aversion; reference-dependence preferences; guilt; reciprocity; social norms; team production (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Desert and inequity aversion in teams (2015)
Working Paper: Desert and Inequity Aversion in Teams (2014)
Working Paper: Desert and inequity aversion in teams (2012)
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