Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games

Alan Beggs

No 603, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies uniqueness of equilibrium in symmetric 2 x 2 bayesian games. It shows that if signals are highly but not perfectly dependent then players play their risk-dominant actions for all but a vanishing set of signal realizations. In contrast to the global games literature, noise is not assumed to be additive. Dependence is modeled using the theory of copulas.

Keywords: Bayesian games; Global games; Uniqueness; Copulas; Risk dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:603

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