Reputation in the Market for Stolen Data

Andrew Mell

No 611, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Internet commerce has made it easier to compare prices and shop online. However, it has also exposed consumers to a new kind of crime in the form of the electronic theft of payment details. However the skills required to successfully intercept payment data differ from the skills required to use that information for one

Keywords: Reputation; Illicit trade; Illegal behavior and the enforement of law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D82 K42 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ict and nep-law
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