Matching with Contracts: An Efficient Marriage Market?

Chloe Qianzi Zeng

No 630, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies a marriage market with two-sided information asymmetry in whichthe gains from marriage are stochastic. Contracts specify divisions of ex-post realizedmarital surplus. I first study a game in which one side of the matching market offerscontracts. I show that when expected marital surplus is strictly monotonic in agents

Keywords: Matching; two-sided information asymmetry; endogenous sharing rule; marriage market; stochastic marital surplus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D13 D82 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-11-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-dem, nep-gth and nep-mic
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