Some Economics of Banking Reform

John Vickers

No 632, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Where do we stand, five years on from the start of the crisis, on progress towards banking reform? Major advances have been made, but a lot of unfinished business remains, notably on structural reform of banks. Following a stock-take of current reform initiatives, the paper reviews some economics of public policy towards banks, starting with the rationale for deposit guarantees and lender-of-last-resort support but concentrating on why governments feel compelled to provide solvency support in crisis. It then covers the economics of capital requirements

Keywords: Banking; bail-outs; capital requirements; deposit guarantees; Glass-Steagall; resolution; ring-fencing; structural reform; Volcker rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-11-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-ban, nep-cba and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Some Economics of Banking Reform (2012)
Journal Article: Some Economics of Banking Reform (2012)
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