Competition in Posted Prices With Bargaining

David Gill and John Thanassoulis

No 639, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we study price competition between firms when some consumers attempt tobargain while others buy at the public list or posted prices. Even though bargainers succeed innegotiating discounts off the list prices, their presence dampens competitive pressure in the marketby reducing the incentive to undercut a rival

Keywords: Posted prices; list prices; collusion; bargaining; negotiation; haggling; discounts; outside option; price takers; Hotelling line (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:639

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