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For Love or Reward? Characterising Preferences for Giving to Parents in an Experimental Setting

Maria Porter and Abigail Adams

No 709, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the motivation for intergenerational transfers between adult children and their parents, and the nature of preferences for such giving behaviour, in an experimental setting. Participants in our experiment play a series of dictator games with parents and strangers, in which we vary endowments and prices for giving to each recipient. We find that preferences for giving are typically rational. When parents are recipients as opposed to strangers, participants display greater sensitivity to the price of giving, and a higher relative proclivity for giving. Our findings also provide evidence of reciprocal motivations for giving, as players give more to parents who have full information regarding the context in which giving occurs.

Keywords: transfer motives; intergenerational; dictator games; lab experiments; altruism; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D12 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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