Limits to Rational Learning
Yehuda Levy (john.calculus@gmail.com)
No 731, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics
Abstract:
A long-standing open question raised in the seminal paper of Kalai and Lehrer (1993) is whether or not the play of a repeated game, in the rational learning model introduced there, must eventually resemble play of exact equilibria, and not just play of approximate equilibria as demonstrated there. This paper shows that play may remain distant - in fact, mutually singular - from the play of any equilibrium of the repeated game. We further show that the same inaccessibility holds in Bayesian games, where the play of a Bayesian equilibrium may continue to remain distant from the play of any equilibrium of the true game.
Keywords: Rational Learning; Repeated Games; Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C65 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Limits to rational learning (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:731
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