Fooling Some of the People Some of the Time: Reputation Management and Optimal Betrayal

Andrew Mell

No 770, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Abstract: A rational long lived player plays against a series of short lived players who use a variant of the Adaptive Play behavioral rule. In equilibrium, under certain conditions, there will be a cut-off level of reputation. If their reputation is below the cut-off, they will build their reputation, and consume out of their reputation if it is above the cut-off. Over the long run, their reputation oscillates around the cut-off. A public relations professional can manipulate the sampling of the short lived players to the benefit of the long lived player. As a result a patient long lived player's behavior will worsen while an impatient long lived player's behavior will improve.

Keywords: Reputation; Adaptive Play; Monitoring; Expectation Formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-mic
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