Electoral Effects of Public Sector Austerity Efforts in the United Kingdom 1900-2015

Rozana Himaz ()

No 773, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Abstract: This paper investigates empirically whether large expenditure cuts and revenue rises that were the result of deliberate political efforts towards being austere had an impact on electoral outcomes in the UK using data from 1900 to 2015. The main electoral outcomes considered are the change in ruling party ideology and the margin of victory faced by the incumbent at the general election, in terms of seats secured. The paper finds that large cuts in spending and large rises in revenue significantly increases the chance of a government changing. However, the loss in seats were significantly higher for the incumbent compared to the winning partly only when large spending cuts were pursued rather than revenue increases during the incumbent's tenure in office. We also find that voters are sensitive to particular types of spending cuts, such as cuts in social security. These results are contrary to those in Alesina et.al (2013) using OECD data for 19 countries from 1975-2008, and several other papers in the empirical literature that found no significant correlation between fiscal adjustment and electoral looses.

Keywords: Fiscal austerity; electoral outcomes; United Kingdom (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 H3 H5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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