Competing Sales Channels

Greg Taylor
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: David Ronayne

No 843, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study strategic interactions in markets where firms sell to consumers both directly and via a competitive channel (CC), such as a price comparison website or marketplace, where multiple sellers’ offers are visible at once. We ask how a CC’s size influences market outcomes. A bigger CC means more consumers compare prices, increasing within-channel competition. However, such seemingly pro-competitive developments can raise prices and reduce consumer surplus by weakening between-channel competition. We also use the model to study relevant active policy issues including price clauses, integrated ownership structures, and access to consumers’ purchase data. Revised April 2020.

JEL-codes: D43 D83 L11 M3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-04-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:ef8e9ce7-9522-4dff-9747-9a8fd027e96f (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:843

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anne Pouliquen (facultyadmin@economics.ox.ac.uk this e-mail address is bad, please contact repec@repec.org).