First Impression Biases in the Performing Arts: Taste-Based Discrimination and the Value of Blind Auditioning

Jasmin Droege

No 892, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: I develop a game-theoretic framework to study the repercussions of an evaluator’s bias against a specific group of applicants. The evaluator decides upfront between holding an informed or a blind audition. In the latter, the evaluator learns neither the applicant’s ability nor the gender. I show that, above a threshold bias, the evaluator prefers a blind audition to provide high effort incentives exclusively for high-ability applicants. Consequently, committing to no information can be beneficial for the evaluator. I also show that a highly biased evaluator’s preferences align with those of a highly able female. The introduction of performance uncertainty may lead to market failure or may render informed auditions more profitable, rationalising ability-targeting interventions. My results can explain why blind auditions have increased the probability of women being hired via taste-based discrimination and challenge explanations grounded in sta¬tistical discrimination.

Keywords: first impression; bias; blind audition; taste-based discrimination; performance un-certainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D81 D86 D91 J16 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-12-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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