On the Convergence of Reinforcement Learning

Alan Beggs

No 96, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the convergence of payoffs and strategies in Erev and Roth`s model of reinforcement learning. When all players use this rule it eliminates iteratively dominated strategies and in two-person constant-sum games average payoffs converge to the value of the game. Strategies converge in constant-sum games with unique equilibria if they are pure or in 2

Keywords: reinforcement learning; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: On the convergence of reinforcement learning (2005)
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