Public Good Provision, Punishment and the Endowment Origin: Experimental Evidence

Armenak Antinyan, Luca Corazzini and Daniel Neururer (daniel.neururer@uibk.ac.at)
Additional contact information
Daniel Neururer: University of Innsbruck

No 169, "Marco Fanno" Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno"

Abstract: We study contributions and punishment in a linear public goods game, where group members differ in the sources of their endowments. We compare homogenous groups in which subjects are exogenously assigned to the same endowments with heterogeneous groups in which half of the group members invest real effort to earn their endowments, while the other half are granted with a windfall amount of equal size. We illustrate, that independent of group composition, free-riding becomes the ubiquitous form of behavior over time if group members cannot sanction each other. If punishment opportunity is present, contributions constantly increase over time, albeit we find differences neither in contributions nor in punishment across heterogeneous and homogenous groups. Furthermore, we also manifest that different subject types make similar contributions in heterogeneous groups. We conjecture that effort invested to earn the endowment seems not to cause conflicting normative views on appropriate contributions among subject types. Nevertheless, within heterogeneous groups subjects, who exert real effort to earn their endowments, punish less severely than those receiving windfall endowments.

Keywords: Endowment Origin; Linear Public Good Game; Punishment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D63 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-nps and nep-pub
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://economia.unipd.it/sites/economia.unipd.it/files/20130169_0.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Public good provision, punishment, and the endowment origin: Experimental evidence (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pad:wpaper:0169

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in "Marco Fanno" Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno" Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Raffaele Dei Campielisi (informatica.economia@unipd.it).