Fueling Organized Crime: The Mexican War on Drugs and Oil Thefts

Giacomo Battiston (), Gianmarco Daniele, Marco Le Moglie and Paolo Pinotti ()
Additional contact information
Giacomo Battiston: University of Padova
Paolo Pinotti: Bocconi University

No 286, "Marco Fanno" Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno"

Abstract: We show that the War on Drugs launched by the Mexican President Felipe Calderón in 2007 pushed drug cartels into large-scale oil thefts. Municipalities that the presidential candidate’s party barely won at the local elections in 2007-2009 exhibit a larger increase in illegal oil taps over the following years, compared to municipalities in which the presidential candidate’s party barely lost the elections. Challenger cartels in the drug market leapfrog incumbent drug cartels when entering the new illegal activity, analogous to what is typically observed in legal markets. Since challengers and incumbents specialize in different criminal sectors, the expansion of challengers does not increase violence in municipalities traversed by oil pipelines. At the same time, the municipalities traversed by a pipeline witness a decrease in schooling rates.

Keywords: organized crime; war on drugs; oil thefts; leapfrogging (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2022-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Fueling Organized Crime: The Mexican War on Drugs and Oil Thefts (2022)
Working Paper: Fueling Organized Crime: The Mexican War on Drugs and Oil Thefts (2022)
Working Paper: Fueling Organized Crime: The Mexican War on Drugs and Oil Thefts (2022)
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