Note on a Two-Player All-pay Auction with Asymmetrical Bidders and Incomplete Information

Marco Magnani

No 2010-EP06, Economics Department Working Papers from Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy)

Abstract: The present paper analyzes a general class of first-price all-pay auctions where two players have different "bidding technologies" and one bidder has a head start advantage over his/her opponent. Equilibria are characterized for the complete information setting and for the case where there is incomplete asymmetrical information. In particular, the handicapped player is uncertain about the size of the opponent’s advantage.

Keywords: All-pay; auctions; and; Auction; theory; and; Games; with; asymmetrical; players; and; Incomplete; information; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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