Evolution towards asymptotic efficiency, preliminary version

Stefano Demichelis ()
Additional contact information
Stefano Demichelis: Department of Economics and Business, University of Pavia

No 173, Quaderni di Dipartimento from University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods

Abstract: We show that in long repeated games, or in infinitely repeated games with discount rate close to one, payoffs corresponding to evolutionary stable sets are asymptotically efficient, as intuition suggests. Actions played at the beginning of the game are used as messages that allow players to coordinate on Pareto optimal outcomes in the following stages. The result builds a bridge between the theory of repeated games and that of communication games.

Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2012-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dem-web.unipv.it/web/docs/dipeco/quad/ps/RePEc/pav/wpaper/q173.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pav:wpaper:173

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Quaderni di Dipartimento from University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paolo Bonomolo ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).