A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences

Claus-Jochen Haake () and Nadja Stroh-Maraun ()
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Nadja Stroh-Maraun: Paderborn University

No 111, Working Papers CIE from Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics

Abstract: We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.

Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2018-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-edu, nep-gth, nep-upt and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pdn:ciepap:111

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