The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription Decision - An Experiment

Vanessa Hilleringmann ()
Additional contact information
Vanessa Hilleringmann: Paderborn University

No 114, Working Papers CIE from Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics

Abstract: Focusing on a physician's relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician's treatment decision. We conduct a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants. We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences in the participants' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in our experiment.

Keywords: Corruption; Reciprocity; Physician-Patient Relationship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 I12 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2018-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://groups.uni-paderborn.de/wp-wiwi/RePEc/pdf/ciepap/WP114.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pdn:ciepap:114

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers CIE from Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by WP-WiWi-Info ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ) and ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).