Size Reduction Reform in German Parliament: a game theoretic analysis of power indices in the Bundestag

Papatya Duman () and Claus-Jochen Haake ()
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Papatya Duman: Paderborn University
Claus-Jochen Haake: Paderborn University

No 158, Working Papers CIE from Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics

Abstract: We investigate whether the recently approved reforms of the apportionment of parliamentary seats to parties in the German Bundestag affects the parties’ political influence measured by power indices. We find that under neither reform the underlying simple game, which describes the possibilities to form governments, remains unchanged and as a result the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf index are unaltered. As a consequence, the major change from the reforms is the size reduction in the Bundestag by currently 106 legislators to 630.

Keywords: Reform Bundestag; Banzhaf power index; Shapley-Shubik power index (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pdn:ciepap:158

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