On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU

Claus-Jochen Haake (), Tim Krieger and Steffen Minter ()
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Steffen Minter: University of Paderborn

No 25, Working Papers CIE from Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics

Abstract: Illegal immigration affects not only EU member states at the Mediterranean Sea but also more Northern states due to open internal borders and onward migration. Northern member states may free-ride on border countries’ enforcement efforts, leading to a sub-optimal level of border control. While neither a centralized nor a coordinated policy appears to be feasible, we show that employing an expected externality mechanism leads to voluntary preference revelation with respect to immigration policy under several (but not all) scenarios. This policy measure requires, however, the EU Commission to take on a very active role as moderator between member states, which at the same time must accept the Commission to play this role.

Keywords: illegal migration; immigration policy; border enforcement; interregional transfers; European Union; expected externality mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 J61 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2010-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pdn:ciepap:25

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