Do children stop cheating when someone else reaps the benefits? A lab in the field experiment

Julia Kramer (), Silvia Lübbecke () and Nina Lucia Stephan ()
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Julia Kramer: University of Paderborn
Silvia Lübbecke: University of Paderborn
Nina Lucia Stephan: University of Paderborn

No 33, Working Papers Dissertations from Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics

Abstract: This paper describes a lab in the field experiment with 512 children, investigating whether cheating depends on who receives the benefits from cheating. In the experiment, children privately toss a fair coin with a 50\% chance of winning a prize and subsequently report the outcome. Children are partnered with another child. In the treatment group, the prize in case of winning is received by the passive partner, instead of the child tossing the coin. We find that the share of prize winning outcomes is significantly reduced when the prize is received by the partner. Results are strongest when the partner is a stranger. In line with existing literature, this effect is weaker and eventually disappears among older children. We argue that part of the effect is explained by children cheating to prevent the partner from receiving the prize, and hence, engaging in downward cheating.

Keywords: cheating; dishonesty; altruism; children; lab-in-the-field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D64 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pdn:dispap:33

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