Crumbling morals? An experimental study on how a social framing can affect embezzlement

Nina Lucia Stephan ()
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Nina Lucia Stephan: Paderborn University

No 46, Working Papers Dissertations from Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics

Abstract: With data from a laboratory experiment we show that the interpersonal experience can either encourage or reduce subsequent immoral decision-making; in this case the immoral decision to engage in embezzlement. In the experiment, subjects first received initial endowments, either as a share from a previous dictator (social framing treatment) or by random determination (neutral framing treatment). Next, subjects could increase their payoff by embezzling, i.e. taking away part of a donation that they are entrusted with, before forwarding the rest. We find that after receiving a less-than-half share in the social framing treatment, in comparison to receiving an equally large amount in the neutral framing treatment, subjects are significantly more likely to embezzle. Thus, depending on the height of endowment, the social framing encourages forfeiting moral behavior. We argue that this effect is driven by self-deception: observing the dictator's decision to share less than half facilitates excusing one's own immoral choice. We conclude that socially framing a moral decision situation, even though this may remind individuals of what is socially acceptable, does not have an unanimously beneficial effect on the moral decision to embezzle.

Keywords: social framing; donations; immoral behavior; embezzlement; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-soc
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