Pareto Efficiency in Weighted School Choice Problems

Nadja Stroh-Maraun (nadja.stroh-maraun@upb.de)
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Nadja Stroh-Maraun: Paderborn University

No 64, Working Papers Dissertations from Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics

Abstract: There are a number of school choice problems in which students are heterogeneous according to the number of seats they occupy at the school they are assigned to. We propose a weighted school choice problem by assigning each student a so-called weight and extend the top trading cycles algorithm to fit to this extension. We call the new mechanism the weighted TTC and show that it is strategy-proof and results in a Pareto efficient matching. Therefore, the TTC is robust towards the introduction of weights. Nevertheless, it is more complex to guarantee each student a seat at a school, as the extension introduces a trade-off between weights and priorities.

Keywords: Matching; School Choice; College Admission Problems; Top Trading Cycles; Pareto Efficiency; Strategy-Proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gen, nep-ore and nep-ure
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