Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment, Second Version

Kenneth Burdett, Ricardo Lagos and Randall Wright

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: There is much discussion of the relationships between crime, inequality, and unemployment. We construct a model where all three are endogenous. We find that introducing crime into otherwise standard models of labor markets has several interesting implications. For example, it can lead to wage inequality among homogeneous workers. Also, it can generate multiple equilibria in natural but previously unexplored ways; hence two identical neighborhoods can end up with different levels of crime, inequality, and unemployment. We discuss the effects of anti-crime policies like changing jail sentences, as well as more traditional labor market policies like changing unemployment insurance.

Keywords: Crime; Inequality; Unemployment; Search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2002-05-03, Revised 2003-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-lab and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (64)

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Journal Article: Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:03-029

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