Endogenous Lobbying

Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the center of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process.

Keywords: Lobbying; citizen-candidate; representative democracy; electoral competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2001-12-01, Revised 2004-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Endogenous Lobbying (2006)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2003)
Working Paper: Endogenous lobbying (2003)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2002)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2000)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:04-043

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