Do Voters Vote Sincerely? Second Version
Arianna Degan and
Antonio Merlo
PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Abstract:
In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely testable or falsifiable? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election, the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is irrefutable, regardless of the number of candidates competing in the election. On the other hand, using data on how the same individuals vote in multiple elections, the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is potentially falsifiable, and we provide general conditions under which the hypothesis can be tested. We then consider an application of our theoretical framework and assess whether the behavior of voters is consistent with sincere voting in U.S. national elections in the post-war period. We find that by and large sincere voting can explain virtually all of the individual-level observations on voting behavior in presidential and congressional U.S. elections in the data.
Keywords: voting; spatial models; falsifiability; testing. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C12 C63 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2006-03-01, Revised 2007-01-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:07-006
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