The Transparency of Politics and the Quality of Politicians

Andrea Mattozzi and Antonio Merlo

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the relationship between the transparency of politics and the quality of politicians in a model of parties’ political recruitment. We find that an increase in the transparency of politics reduces the average quality of the politicians a party recruits in equilibrium

Keywords: Transparency; politicians; parties; political recruitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J44 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2007-01-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Journal Article: The Transparency of Politics and the Quality of Politicians (2007)
Working Paper: The Transparency of Politics and the Quality of Politicians (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:07-008

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