Strategic Firms and Endogenous Consumer Emulation

Philipp Kircher and Andrew Postlewaite

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: Better informed consumers may be treated preferentially by firms since their consumption serves as a quality signal for other customers. For normal goods this results in wealthy individuals being treated better than poor individuals. We investigate this phenomenon in an equilibrium model of social learning with heterogeneous consumers and firms that act strategically. Consumers search for high quality firms and condition their choices on observed actions of other consumers. When they observe consumers who are more likely to have identified a high quality firm, uninformed individuals will optimally emulate those consumers. One group of consumers arises endogenously as “leaders†whose consumption behavior is emulated. Follow-on sales induce firms to give preferential treatment to these lead consumers, which reinforces their learning.

Keywords: Search; social learning; consumption signalling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2008-01-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Firms and Endogenous Consumer Emulation (2008)
Working Paper: Strategic firms and endogenous consumer emulation (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:08-003

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