Efficiency of Simultaneous Search

Philipp Kircher

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: We analyze a labor search model in which workers choose their search intensity by deciding how often and where to apply for jobs. They observe firms’ wage postings prior to their decision. Due to coordination frictions a firm may not receive any applications; otherwise it is able to hire unless all its applicants have better offers. We show that in equilibrium the entry of firms, the search intensity and the number of filled vacancies are constrained efficient. Wage dispersion creates an (endogenous) safety net against unemployment that is essential for efficiency. As application costs vanish the equilibrium becomes unconstrained efficient.

Keywords: simultaneous search; directed search; efficient wage dispersion; modified Hosios condition; search with stable matchings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D85 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2008-01-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/file ... ng-papers/08-004.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Efficiency of Simultaneous Search (2009)
Working Paper: Efficiency of simultaneous search (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:08-004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 133 South 36th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Administrator ().