Preferences for One-Shot Resolution of Uncertainty and Allais-Type Behavior

David Dillenberger ()
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David Dillenberger: Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: We study a decision maker (DM) who has recursive preferences over compound lotteries and who cares about the way uncertainty is resolved over time. DM has preferences for one-shot resolution of uncertainty (PORU) if he always prefers any compound lottery to be resolved in a single stage. We establish an equivalence between dynamic PORU and static preferences that are identified with the behavior observed in Allais-type experiments. We define the gradual resolution premium and demonstrate its magnifying effect when combined with the usual risk premium. In an intertemporal context, PORU capture "loss aversion with narrow framing".

Keywords: recursive preferences over compound lotteries; resolution of uncertainty; Allais paradox; narrow framing; negative certainty independence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2008-10-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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