Worker Replacement
Guido Menzio and
Espen Moen ()
PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Abstract:
We consider a frictional labor market in which firms want to insure their senior employees against income fluctuations and, at the same time, want to recruit new employees to fill their vacant positions. Firms can commit to a wage schedule, i.e. a schedule that specifies the wage paid by the firm to its employees as function of their tenure and other observables. However, firms cannot commit to the employment relationship with any of their workers, i.e. firms can dismiss workers at will. We find that, because of the firm’s limited commitment, the optimal schedule prescribes not only a rigid wage for senior employees, but also a downward rigid wage for new hires. Moreover, we find that, while the rigidity of the wage of senior workers does not affect the allocation of labor, the rigidity of the wage of new hires magnifies the response of unemployment and vacancies to negative shocks to the aggregate productivity of labor.
Keywords: Competitive Search; Risk Sharing; Unemployment; Business Cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 E32 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2008-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-dge, nep-lab and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Worker replacement (2010) 
Working Paper: Worker replacement (2010) 
Working Paper: Worker Replacement (2008) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:08-040
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