The Political Economy of Protection

Wilfred Ethier ()

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: This paper offers a selective, interpretative survey of the literature on the political economy of international trade policy. Unilateral trade policy and multilateral trade agreements are covered, but preferential trading arrangements are not. Much of the literature is characterized either by a discrepancy between what policymakers say they are doing and how the theory models their actions (the Cognitive Dissonance issue) or by a lack of a detailed microeconomic foundation (the Black Box issue).

Keywords: Political support function; Protection For Sale; trade agreements; exchange of market access (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F02 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2010-06-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:10-022

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