Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version

George Mailath and Larry Samuelson ()
Additional contact information
Larry Samuelson: Department of Economics, Yale University

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.

Keywords: commitment; incomplete information; reputation bound; reputation effects; long-run relationships; reputations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 86 pages
Date: 2013-06-27, Revised 2013-08-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/13-044.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:13-044

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 133 South 36th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Administrator ().