The Dynamics of Discrimination: Theory and Evidence

Aislinn Bohren, Alex Imas (aimas@andrew.cmu.edu) and Michael Rosenberg
Additional contact information
Alex Imas: Department of Economics, Carnegie Melon University
Michael Rosenberg: Wayfair, Inc.

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: We model the dynamics of discrimination and show how its evolution can identify the underlying cause. We test these theoretical predictions in a field experiment on a large online platform where users post content that is evaluated by other users on the platform. We assign posts to accounts that exogenously vary by gender and history of evaluations. With no prior evaluations, women face significant discrimination, while following a sequence of positive evaluations, the direction of discrimination reverses: posts by women are favored over those by men. According to our theoretical predictions, this dynamic reversal implies discrimination driven by biased beliefs.

Keywords: Discrimination; Dynamic Behavior; Field Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D9 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 59 pages
Date: 2017-11-18, Revised 2017-11-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gen and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Dynamics of Discrimination: Theory and Evidence (2019)
Working Paper: The Dynamics of Discrimination: Theory and Evidence (2018)
Working Paper: The Dynamics of Discrimination: Theory and Evidence (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:17-021

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