Doctrine of public good in banking versus state intervention
Piotr Masiukiewicz ()
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Piotr Masiukiewicz: Warsaw School of Economics, Poland
No 38/2014, Working Papers from Institute of Economic Research
Abstract:
This article has a following thesis: changes in banking and a role of banks in real economy in last years, give an argument for treating banks as public good. Banks received a great support from governments as a result of the subprime crisis. G-20 and European Commission recommended new regulations for this sector after crisis. As consequence of banking development more than 90% of population use banking services in many countries. New social functions of banks appeared. Doctrines about recovery and government support for banks were changed in parallel (e.g. LoLR). Presently there are some arguments for recognition of public good doctrine in banking such as: a very big area for state regulation, state banking supervision, state system of deposits insurance, realization of task delegated by the state, social responsibility of banks and other. These arguments confirm that banks’ activity has a particular importance for society and economy and would be public good.
Keywords: bankruptcy; bank; crisis; financial institution; public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G21 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12, Revised 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-hme
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pes:wpaper:2014:no38
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