A paradox of reforming pensions in Poland

Anna Zabkowicz ()
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Anna Zabkowicz: Uniwersytet Jagiellonski

No 118/2015, Working Papers from Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: Recent years see intense reforming of funded pensions sub-system in Poland. Actually, what are policy objectives like at which change in design introduced in 2013 (mandatory funding) and projected in 2014 (voluntary funding) is oriented? The article briefly reports what was contemporary re-designing of the pension system at different stages about and reconstructs objectives of reforming at each stage. It finds that interlocking streams of change aimed at two goals in fact which are i) relief to public finance ii) expanding pension funding by financial intermediaries. It argues that the two are in contradiction to each other, and this makes a paradox of pension reforming. The review of 2013- and 2014- design, unexpectedly enough, results in conclusion that at present reforming is focused on pension funding revitalization which may cause a recurring distress to public finance. Thus, the article identifies one of dilemmas of institutional-order development in Poland which can be probably also experienced in other countries where pension funding has been introduced.

Keywords: funded pensions; pension reform; public finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04, Revised 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age and nep-hme
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