Challenges of Direct European Supervision of Financial Markets

László Szegedi

Public Finance Quarterly, 2012, vol. 57, issue 3, 347-357

Abstract: The response of the European Union to the financial crises included the establishment of bodies dedicated to macro-prudential as well as microprudential supervision called European System of Financial Supervisors. As result of the reform regulatory powers have been delegated to sector-specific European Supervisory Authorities in charge of microprudential super-vision. The delegation could contravene the Lisbon primary law, especially the related case law followed by the Court of Justice of the European Union as the so-called Meroni doctrine restricts the delegation of concrete binding decision-making powers on European agencies like ESAs. However their power to issue individual decisions, addressed to financial institutions, could be considered as required tool in crisis management which makes it obvious that the primary EU law on European agencies needs to be clarified and broadened.

Keywords: Internal Market; Financial crisis; European Supervisory Authorities; EU Agencies; Meroni doctrine (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F36 G15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pfq:journl:v:57:y:2012:i:3:p:347-357

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