Governance in Europe, Trends and Fault Lines
Istvan Benczes () and
Gergely Rezessy
Public Finance Quarterly, 2013, vol. 58, issue 2, 133-147
Abstract:
The deepening of European integration has been expected to trigger constant adjustments in Member States since the start, especially with regard to the harmonisation of development of their national institutions. Our empirical analysis of Member State-level governance found, however, that such an expectation proved to be an illusion in most of the cases. One of the most typical lessons of the past decade or so is precisely that the quality of governance has deteriorated in quite a few countries despite the fact that it was during this period that the euro was introduced, allowing a level of integration deeper than ever before. This in turn signals that establishing successful European-level uniform governance is a hopeless endeavour – at least with the current Member States. The deep-rooted differences impact the ability of countries to move together with the rest and also their capacities to achieve macro-economic convergence. The absence of such convergence does not simply make individual Member States vulnerable, but endangers the whole of the euro area.
Keywords: governance; euro; convergence; cluster analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O52 P51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pfq:journl:v:58:y:2013:i:2:p:133-147
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