Gatekeeper Versus Auctioneer: A Non-Tatonnement Result

Emmanuel de Dios () and Grace Ong

No 201002, UP School of Economics Discussion Papers from University of the Philippines School of Economics

Abstract: A non-tatonnement process is described using the simplest demand-and-supply model, involving the following : uniformly distributed agents; random matching of buyers and sellers; and a universal permission to engage in mutually acceptable trade at non-equilibrium prices. A sufficient condition is then stated where expected welfare gains are paradoxically greater when the number of market agents is restricted, compared to when all traders are allowed to participate.

Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2010-03
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Published as UPSE Discussion Paper No. 2010-02, March 2010

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