Fiscal transfers and gerrymandering under decentralization in the Philippines

Joseph Capuno

No 201304, UP School of Economics Discussion Papers from University of the Philippines School of Economics

Abstract: While gerrymandering in developing countries is often pushed by local authorities to secure political advantages, fiscal grants systems under decentralization may also have result in the same. We investigate this issue to identify the correlates of the growth in the number of cities in the Philippines in 2001-2010. Using a panel of municipal-level data, incremental fiscal transfers are found to drive cityhood. Also, political payoffs -- like the incumbent mayor's re-election or having another member of the same political clan elected to the same position -- motivate the creation of new cities. Reforms in the country's fiscal transfer program are suggested.

Keywords: Gerrymandering; fiscal grants; decentralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H73 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2013-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-sea
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Published as UPSE Discussion Paper No. 2013-04, June 2013

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:phs:dpaper:201304

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