 Helping Cost, Assortative Matching and Production Cycles in the Dynamic Humean Farmer GameNo 201513, UP School of Economics Discussion Papers from University of the Philippines School of Economics Abstract: We reformulate the Humean farmer game on the basis of random assignment of advantage and the cost e of helping in another’s harvest. The result is a game that is a coordination game if e ½ which allows a joint treatment of the two interpretations of the Humean farmer game. We employ two behavioral types initially: the conditionally cooperative (H-type) and the free riding (NH-type). We employ replication dynamics with assortative matching and multiple production cycles to investigate which evolutionarily stable (EE) monomorphic population it engenders. We show that the ceiling for effort cost e to support an EE monomorphic H-type population in the Stag-Hunt game rises to (1 + b)/2 from 1/2 in pure random matching case. As the assortative index b rises, the basin of attraction of the EE H-type solution rises. When the assortative matching is perfect (b = 1), in the Stag-Hunt game version (0 ½), s* = 0 is EE iff e > (3/4) while s** = 1 is EE. Keywords: Humean farmer game; helping cost; assortative matching; production cycles; emergence of cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published as UPSE Discussion Paper No. 2015-13, November 2015 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:phs:dpaper:201513 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in UP School of Economics Discussion Papers from University of the Philippines School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC. |
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